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AN ACCOMMODATION IS ORDINARILY PRESUMED TO
BE UNREASONABLE IF IT VIOLATES AN EMPLOYER'S
BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEM UNLESS THE
EMPLOYEE CAN SHOW SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT MAKE IT REASONABLE:
U.S. AIRWAYS, INC. V. BARNETT
MONICA G. RENNA*
C ONGRESS PASSED the American with Disabilities Act'
(ADA) to provide legal recourse against disability-based dis-
crimination in employment and to direct a national mandate to
eliminate it.2 Courts, however, have repeatedly issued decisions
that narrow the scope of the ADA and strictly interpret its broad
provisions against employees. 3 Although the Supreme Court re-
jects a per se bar approach to seniority systems in U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, the reality of its holding creates a heavy, blanket
presumption of non-reasonableness for all accommodations that
violate a seniority system. Though the Court leaves a small hole
through which a disabled employee may prevail, it undermines
the policies and principles of the ADA by setting an almost unat-
tainable threshold for the employee while attributing too much
power to seniority systems.
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42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2003).
2 Id. § 12101(b).
3 See generally William Smith, Drawing Boundaries, 88 A.B.A. 49, 50 (2000) (cit-
ing cases).
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After working ten years at U.S. Airways, Robert Barnett in-
jured his back in 1990 while on the job and could no longer
work as a cargo handler.4 He invoked his seniority rights to
transfer to the company's mailroom. In 1992, Barnett's position
became open to seniority-based bidding by other employees.
Barnett requested that U.S. Airways make an exception and al-
low him to remain in his mailroom position as a reasonable ac-
commodation (RA) pursuant to the ADA. U.S. Airways,
however, refused to make an exception and allowed other em-
ployees to bid on Barnett's job. Consequently, Barnett was im-
mediately unemployed.
Barnett brought suit in the U. S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California claiming that U.S. Airways discrimi-
nated against him by refusing to reasonably accommodate his
disability. The district court held that in light of the ADA ex-
emption for undue hardship, having to deviate from U.S. Air-
ways' seniority system would impose undue hardship on both
U.S. Airways and its non-disabled employees and granted sum-
mary judgment to U.S. Airways.5
An en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.' The Ninth Circuit conducted its own analysis of Bar-
nett's request in the context of undue hardship. The court
stated that a seniority system does not provide a per se bar to
reassignment, rather it is merely "a factor in the undue hardship
analysis" and that a "case-by-case fact intensive analysis is re-
quired to determine whether any particular reassignment would
constitute an undue hardship to the employer."7
In July 2002, the U. S. Supreme Court handed down a 54
decision that vacated the Ninth Circuit's holding and remanded
the case.' The Court held that an employer's demonstration
that an RA conflicts with seniority rules would ordinarily, as a
matter of law, render the accommodation unreasonable. The
Court also held that an employee could overcome summary
judgment by showing that special circumstances exist, which
make the accommodation nevertheless reasonable in his case.
The ADA compels an employer to make "reasonable accom-
modations" to an employee's disability, unless the employer can
4 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (2002) [hereinafter Barnett II].
5 Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Barnett 1].
6 Id. at 1122.
7 Id. at 1120.
8 Barnett 11, 122 S.Ct. at 1525.
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prove the accommodation causes "undue hardship on the oper-
ation of the business."9 Congress suggests "reassignment to a
vacant position" 10 as an RA;II however, the employer is not re-
quired to "bump" another employee out of his or her position.' -2
Undue hardship is defined as an action "requiring significant
difficulty or expense" in light of factors such as the employer's
size, operations, financial resources, responsibilities, and other
employees.' 3 In any disability discrimination case, the employee
must first prove that the reassignment is reasonable, which the
ADA sets at a relatively low threshold: a reassignment only has to
be "feasible for the employer."' 4 It is important to note that,
unlike other federal employment-discrimination laws, the ADA
does not provide employers with a defense or exemption for
bona fide seniority systems. 5 The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) is the agency assigned to issue regu-
lations to carry out the statutory language of the ADA and has
produced several well-accepted interpretive aids that help deci-
pher the scope of its provisions.1 7 Despite all of the interpretive
help from the EEOC and the ADA's goal of providing "clear and
comprehensive" 18 provisions, the various circuits have histori-
cally disagreed'" on exactly what the RA requirement entails and
have recently turned to the Supreme Court for guidance.
Like a fast moving train, the Court tracks its course of the RA
requirement through several points of contention before get-
ting to the heart of its decision. The Court begins by correctly
dismissing, as a misreading of the statute, U.S. Airways' assertion
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (5) (A).
10 Id. § 12111(9)(B).
I I See generally Paul Panken, Representing the Restaurant Industry, SG 104 ALI-ABA
373 (2002) (discussing the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA).
12 Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111; see generally David Harger, Drawing the Line Between Rea-
sonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA: Reducing the Effect of Am-
biguity on Small Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 783 (discussing undue hardship).
14 Sprague v. United Airlines, Inc., No. Civ.A.97-12102-GAO, 2002 WL
1803733, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2002).
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113; Barnett I, 228 F.3d at n.10.
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLI-
ANCE MANUAL § 600.1.
17 See generally Stephen Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation
Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439 (discussing
aids and guides).
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b).
19 See e.g., Stephen Befort & Tracey Donesky, Reassignment Under the ADA: Rea-
sonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045,
1061 (discussing cases from various circuits).
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that the ADA requires "equal" but not "preferential" treatment
of disabled employees. 21 The Court explains, to the contrary,
that the ADA recognizes that preferential treatment may be nec-
essary to accomplish its mandate for equal opportunity.2' The
very nature of RA's calls for employers to treat disabled employ-
ees differently than non-disabled ones by revising or removing
work-place barriers to employment.22 The Court also clarifies
that a position qualifies as vacant under the ADA even though a
seniority system will automatically assign an employee to it. The
vacancy of a position hinges on its availability, and according to
the Court, seniority systems allow a position to become open for
bidding even though an employee like Barnett currently occu-
pies it.23 The Court then appropriately rejects Barnett's defini-
tion of "reasonable accommodation" that reads "reasonable" as
"effective."24 Guided by the ordinary meaning of the term "rea-
sonable" and its use in the ADA, the Court concludes that "rea-
sonable" cannot mean "effective" and justifies its reading via an
example: an effective accommodation, one that meets the em-
ployee's disability needs, can still be unreasonable if it imposes
an undue hardship on the employer.25
The heart of the Supreme Court's decision is found in its dis-
cussion of Barnett's other contention, and, unfortunately, it is
here where the Court's analytical train of thought runs off track.
Barnett asserts a two-pronged argument for why a seniority sys-
tem cannot, in and of itself, defeat an accommodation as unrea-
sonable. First, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit, Barnett
asserts that a seniority system should be a factor, but not a deter-
minative one, in the undue hardship analysis.26 Ultimately, Bar-
nett wants the Court to assess undue hardship on a case-by-case
basis to determine the impact on the individual employer and
the expectations of its employees. Therefore, any blanket pre-
sumption or per se rule would be inappropriate. For the second
prong, Barnett points out that requiring an "employee [to]
counter a claim of 'seniority rule violation"' to prove that a reas-
20 Barnett II, 122 S.Ct. at 1520-21.
21 Id. at 1521.
22 Barnett 1, 228 F.3d at 1118.
23 Barnett II, 122 S.Ct. at 1521.
24 Id. at 1522-23.
25 Id. at 1522.
26 Barnett I, 228 F.3d at 1120.
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signment is reasonable would create an improper shift in bur-
den of proof from employer to employee.2 7
In addressing the first prong, the Court refuses to look at the
reassignment under an undue hardship analysis because it be-
lieves, instead, that seniority systems speak to an employee's
need to show that an accommodation is reasonable on its face. 28
The Court also rejects the case-by-case approach and concludes
that a bona fide seniority system is a determinative indicator of
unreasonableness. In its analysis, the Court takes the ADA's des-
ignated undue hardship factors and incorrectly applies them to
the reasonableness of Barnett's request. The Court names the
importance of "seniority to employee-management relations" as
the basis for its holding. -9 It opines that the importance of such
a system is directly tied to employee expectations of fair/uni-
form treatment, job security, predictable advancement, and the
incentive to invest in a company to reap long-term benefits.3 0
Furthermore, the Court does not want to substitute case-specific
decisions for the more "uniform, impersonal operation of se-
niority rules."3 1 It cites its own prior decisions as well as those of
lower courts as an affirmation of the power of seniority systems
to trump the need to accommodate.32 The Court believes that,
ordinarily, the cost to all employees of disrupting an established
seniority system far outweighs the benefit of accommodating a
disabled employee. The Court's reasoning is misguided for two
reasons.
First, the Court's case precedent can be distinguished by the
fact that the cases are dealing with collectively bargained senior-
ity systems. 3 3 U.S. Airways' seniority system, like many others, is
unilaterally imposed by management. The Court maintains this
difference does not matter because the same advantages and
problems with violations are found in both types of systems. 34
To the contrary, this difference is important because it proves
troublesome the Court's blanket presumption that applies
equally to both kinds of systems and shows that a case-by-case
27 Barnett I, 122 S.Ct. at 1522.
28 Id. at 1523.
29 Id. at 1524.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. (citing a line of cases from various circuits).
33 Brian Kavanaugh, Collective Bargaining Agreements and the ADA: A Problematic
Limitation of 'Reasonable Accommodation'for the Union Employee, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
751 (1999).
34 Barnett I, 122 S.Ct. at 1524.
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analysis is needed. With collectively bargained systems, contrac-
tual obligations with the union make the system legally enforce-
able; therefore, employees are justified in expecting the items
on the Court's list.3 5 Non-collectively bargained systems, how-
ever, do not share the same legal obligations or required consis-
tency. U.S. Airways, for example, reserves the right to "change
any and all portions of the seniority system at will." 36 Neverthe-
less, the Court grants the system bona fide status because it had
been in place for so long. The Ninth Circuit and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence raise the same point of concern: when
no legally bargained-for rights are involved, it does not seem as
though a seniority system would bar accommodation.3 7 Even
under the Court's guise of reasonableness, Barnett's accommo-
dation would have a very insignificant effect on U.S. Airways'
cost, operations, and other employees. Other employees are
not legally entitled to the position because the system is not le-
gally enforceable; Barnett already occupied the position, so
there is no "bumping" involved, and permanently reassigning
him to the mailroom would only maintain the status quo.38 In
addition, the type of discretionary decisions employers would
have to make under a case-by-case analysis, which the Court
fears, is the only kind that addresses the "individualized needs of
the disabled employee and the specific burdens" placed on em-
ployers. 9 Second, the Court's presumption that seniority sys-
tems trump RA's conflicts with EEOC guidelines, legislative
history, and the ADA's modus operandii' The ADA and the
EEOC emphasize that it is reasonable4" for employers to make
exceptions for the disabled to disability-neutral workplace poli-
cies that it would not make for the non-disabled. The EEOC
35 See Panken, supra note 11, at 419 (discussing EEOC doctrine versus circuit
court decisions).
36 Barnett II, 122 S.Ct. at 1522.
37 Id. at 1526-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord, Barnett 1, 228 F.3d at 1119.
38 Barnett I 122 S.Ct. at 1525-26 (Stevens, J., concurring) (questioning "main-
tain[ing] the status quo" and "exactly what impact the grant of [Barnett's] re-
quest would have on other employees").
39 Barnett I, 228 F.3d at 1120.
40 Because there is no legislative history or ADA/EEOC discussion on non-
union seniority systems, it is necessary and helpful to look at such statements on
unionized systems for guidance on how to handle a unilateral policy, while still
keeping the differences between the two types of systems in mind.
41 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1999) (defining an RA as "any change in the work
environment or in way things are customarily done that enables... [a disabled]
individual to enjoy employment opportunities"); see also Barnett II, 122 S.Ct. at
1522.
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also rejects any blanket rule that prioritizes a seniority system
over an RA.42 Additionally, legislative history, which the Ninth
Circuit cites in its opinion, indicates Congressional intent for
seniority systems to be one of multiple factors considered. 3 The
Court's holding allows an employer to circumvent the undue
hardship burden by only requiring it to show the existence of a
seniority system. The Court fails to reconcile the authority it
grants to seniority systems with the lack of an ADA defense for
bona fide seniority systems. 44
In addressing the second prong of Barnett's argument, the
Court dismisses Barnett's concern over an improper shift in bur-
den of proof by tracing the way lower courts have reconciled RA
with undue hardship.45 While it is true that the cited decisions
do follow a proper burden-shifting procedure, the Supreme
Court's holding creates the very burden of proof dilemma to
which Barnett is referring. The Court unduly raises the bar for
the employee to establish a prima facie case of an RA, when the
burden should really be on the employer to prove undue hard-
ship. Just as Barnett and the Ninth Circuit feared, an employee
essentially has to prove the absence of hardship because the
Court has assumed "that which is the employer's burden to
prove."46 While the holding seems to make sense for legally
binding union systems, an employer with a unilateral seniority
policy enjoys the same advantage from the Court's presumption
of unreasonableness, and the employees bear an undue burden.
The Court's holding seems to be a victory for employers who
are unwilling to sacrifice convenience, policy, or operations to
accommodate disabled employees. The ADA wanted employers
to reasonably foot the bill for making workplace changes to in-
crease the number of disabled people in the workforce, but the
Barnett decision significantly narrows that obligation. 47 Fewer
accommodations will be available to employees, for a seniority
system will automatically eliminate positions to which they were
previously entitled under the ADA.48 Lower courts will likely see
42 Barnett 1, 228 F.3d at 1119.
43 Id. (discussing House and Senate reports).
44 Id. at n.10; see Barnett II, 122 S.Ct. at 1532 (Soutter, J. & Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting).
45 Barnett II, 122 S.Ct. at 1523.
46 Barnett I, 228 F.3d at 1120.
47 Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA, 5
GREEN BAG 2D 361, 368 (2002).
48 Sara Jurand, Seniority Trumps ADA, Supreme Court Rules, 38 JUL TRIAL 14, 16
(2002).
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a surge in litigation regarding what constitutes special circum-
stances because the Court fails to provide sufficient guidelines.
The Court does give a short, non-exhaustive list of conditions
that may defeat summary judgment, but circuits will have to de-
cide on their own whether an employee has shown enough to
prove that their seniority system is not sufficiently bona fide.a
Employers may also want to review their case for special circum-
stances to avoid losing summary judgment. Although few courts
have had the opportunity to implement the Barnett holding, the
Seventh Circuit recently applied Barnett to mean that an em-
ployer does not have to give a disabled employee a break from
the employer's normal method of filling vacancies in order to
keep her job when a better qualified employee wants the posi-
tion.50 The Seventh Circuit's reading extends the presumption
made for seniority systems to a more general disability-neutral
work policy and broadens the exceptions made for seniority to
include employee qualifications. Unfortunately, the decision
continues the trend set by the Supreme Court that reinforces a
pro-employer mentality and limits the efficacy of the ADA.
The Supreme Court's decision raises the burden of proof and
lowers the probability that an otherwise qualified employee will
be able to work in spite of a disability. The Supreme Court must
recognize that the collective rights of non-disabled employees
do not have to suffer in order for disabled employees to suc-
ceed, and courts, including the Supreme Court, should proceed
with a sense of the consequences of moving drastically in either
direction.
49 Compare Wood v. Crown, No. 4:01-CV-40127, 2002 WL 2005451, at *8 (S.D.
Iowa Aug. 29, 2002), with EEOC v. Value Merch. Co., No. 01-2224-DJW, 2002 WL
1932533, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 2002) and Dilley v. Supervalu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958,
963-64 (10th Cir. 2002).
50 Mays v. Principi, No. 01-4227, 2002 WL 2019361, at *5 (7th Cir. Sept. 5,
2002).
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